The Concept of Tacit Knowledge – A Critique by Nielsen, Klaus
Summary
This article questions the concept of tacit knowledge
as the basis for our conceptual understanding of prac-
tice. The first part of the article is a critical introduc-
tion to the concept of tacit knowledge. It is empha-
sized that this concept is situated in various academic
practices and not defined and homogeneously but in
accordance with issues and intentions significant for
these practices.
The second part of the article outlines some conse-
quences of conceptualizing practice as basically a
matter of tacit knowledge. It is argued that tacit
knowledge should be seen in relation to the growth of
professions in modern society and to the need to legit-
imate them. It is further claimed that as a legitimating
concept tacit knowledge may bring about various
problems leading to a marginalization of specific ex-
periences, to social uniformity, to the reappearance of
individualism and to the maintenance of a dualistic
view of knowledge.
I
n recent years concepts of intuitive exper-
tise and tacit knowledge have become in-
creasingly important factors in discus-
sions concerning knowledge and learning in
practice. Apparently, new studies of learning
and knowledge in practice have turned our
notions of knowledge and intuition upside
down. The following quotation is an excel-
lent illustration of this: 
“We once asked chess champion of the Nether-
lands, Jan Donner, why women had never risen to
the highest levels in chess. Donner’s puzzling re-
ply was that women in chess lack intuition”
(Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 25).
This quotation leads to the following ques-
tions: Would it influence our understanding
of learning and knowledge if we conceptual-
ized what we do in practice on the basis of
concepts such as tacit knowledge and intu-
itive expertise?1 Would it bring us new in-
sights, or would the above quotation set the
scene for reductive prejudices regarding, for
example, men and women? 
The main purpose of this article is to call
attention to our conceptual approach to prac-
tice. The notion of tacit knowledge is one
way of conceptualizing practice based on as-
sumptions about a specific kind of knowl-
edge. Due to the key concept of tacit knowl-
edge, this will primarily be an epistemologi-
cal approach to practice. Epistemology is
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1 This article focuses specifically on the concept of tacit
knowledge which is the conceptual basis for a number of
other concepts within the area, among others Dreyfus and
Dreyfus’ (1986) concept of intuitive expertise. However,
Dreyfus and Dreyfus reject the concept of tacit knowledge
and prefer the concept of intuition (Dreyfus & Dreyfus,
1986, p. 152). This distinction will be discussed later in
the article.
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here understood as a specific way of portray-
ing the relationship between subject and
world where this relationship is primarily
seen as a matter of the subject knowing the
world. In this article I shall discuss the conse-
quences that emerge if we accept tacit knowl-
edge as the conceptual foundation for our un-
derstanding of practice. 
The article is divided into three parts. In
the first part the concept of tacit knowledge is
introduced, and in the two following parts I
outline different consequences of adopting
tacit knowledge as the basis of our conceptu-
al approach to practice. 
In the first part an account of Polanyi’s in-
troduction of the concept of tacit knowledge
is followed by an outline of approaches
which have reinterpreted the concept of tacit
knowledge in the last couple of decades. The
work of Dreyfus and Dreyfus and different
interpretations of Wittgenstein represent this
approach in which especially the inexpress-
ible dimension of tacit knowledge is central.
Finally, a more cognitive approach by Wag-
ner and Sternberg is introduced in which tacit
knowledge is related to a specific kind of
practical intelligence. 
In the second part of the article it is argued
that tacit knowledge should be seen in rela-
tion to the rise of professions in modern soci-
ety and the need to legitimate these profes-
sions. The new professions legitimate them-
selves by importing a scientific approach to
knowledge and learning. In this context, tacit
knowledge can be seen as a compromise be-
tween remaining scientific, on the one hand,
and developing a concept containing the spe-
cific and unique experiences of the partici-
pating professionals, on the other hand. 
The third part of the article claims that tac-
it knowledge makes practice more inaccessi-
ble to the participants. It is argued that pro-
fessional practice may be mystified and be-
come reified for the participants. More spe-
cifically, by legitimating practice as a matter
of epistemology, it is argued that social uni-
formity, individualism and a dualistic view of
knowledge can be seen as consequences of
using the concept of tacit knowledge to ex-
plain professional practice. 
Background of the concept
The following is a critical presentation of the
concept of tacit knowledge. Rather than giv-
ing an abstract philosophical account of the
concept, different reasons for introducing
and using the concept of tacit knowledge
shall be outlined in order to situate it in dif-
ferent academic contexts. By taking this ap-
proach, we come to realize that the concept
of tacit knowledge is by no means a homoge-
neous concept. On the contrary, it is defined
in various ways depending on the context and
the kind of issues and problems dominating
this particular context. In fact, the concept
has been used in various contexts, covering
widely different and at times almost conflict-
ing matters. 
Originally, the Hungarian philosopher Po-
lanyi introduced the concept of tacit knowl-
edge but, as we shall see below, in recent
years the concept has attained several mean-
ings. First, I shall isolate Polanyi’s original
understanding of the concept of tacit knowl-
edge as tradition-bound rules and then pre-
sent other understandings of it.
Tacit Knowledge as Knowledge of
Tradition
In 1958 Polanyi introduced the concept of
tacit knowledge in his work “Personal Knowl-
edge” (Polanyi, 1994). One of Polanyi’s mo-
tives for working with this concept was to
make it function as a strategic concept. Po-
lanyi was a professor of chemistry and con-
cerned with the growing political influence
on science. In that context he developed the
concept of tacit knowledge to ensure that sci-
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ence would remain independent and not be
governed by external interests (Carlgren,
1990c; cf. also Rolf, 1991). As I shall argue
in this paper, it is a recurring feature in the
history of the concept of tacit knowledge that
it tends to transform power relations into
questions of knowledge and epistemology.
According to Polanyi, the concept of per-
sonal knowledge is a combination of subjec-
tive experience and collective rules for action
embedded in various traditions. For instance,
in court the judge’s sentence is based on an
expert opinion within the legal tradition of
that particular area. This means that another
judge who experiences a similar situation
and a similar case, will rule in nearly the
same way and reach the same result. It is still
a matter of the judge’s personal opinion
which is based on how he or she applies the
various rules in practice. This opinion, or
professional assessment, is the personal di-
mension of the acts which the judge carries
out in connection with his or her professional
duties. 
On Polanyi’s account, the concept of tacit
knowledge is a central characteristic of per-
sonal knowledge emphasizing that it is partly
tacit. 
According to Polanyi, tacit knowledge al-
ways involves epistemology. He also sug-
gests that tacit knowledge is to be understood
as a combination of concept and sense im-
pression. An individual’s experiences are
based on his or her own activities and com-
bined with concepts passed down by tradi-
tion. 
Tradition is passed down through the con-
cepts of language and by using language as a
tool in different situations. Language as such
has no directions for use, but tradition has.
Tradition implies a number of tacit rules for
how to use a language. Thus, language be-
comes the place where tradition and individ-
ual experience meet (Rolf, 1991). According
to Polanyi, tacit knowledge is acquired
through apprenticeship. In many ways, ap-
prenticeship becomes the paradigmatic illus-
tration of learning precisely because tradition
is passed down through learning by doing, by
submitting to authority and trusting the expe-
rienced practitioner (Polanyi, 1994). The im-
portant point here is that Polanyi’s interpreta-
tion of tacit knowledge is socially based on
tradition and embedded in a number of im-
plicit rules which can, in principle and if nec-
essary, become explicit.
Tacit Knowledge as an Inexpressible
Dimension of Practice 
In recent years Polanyi’s original concept of
tacit knowledge has been reinterpreted; that
is, tacit knowledge is now understood as
something which, in principle, is inexpress-
ible. This reinterpretation is particularly
based on research from the research center on
working life, “Arbeidslivscentrum”, in
Stockholm on how the introduction of infor-
mation technology has influenced our under-
standing of knowledge and learning (cf.
Göranzon, 1990). Here Polanyi’s concept of
tacit knowledge was reinterpreted in light of
the introduction of new computer technolo-
gy. As mentioned earlier, one of Polanyi’s
motives for adopting the concept of tacit
knowledge was to develop a strategic con-
cept to safeguard scientific practice from ex-
ternal political interference. A strategic
thinking also motivated the reinterpretation
of the concept of tacit knowledge at Ar-
beidslivscentrum. One purpose here was to
develop a conceptual tool to protect local
working communities against increased ra-
tionalization through the introduction of new
computer technology. Yet, this strategic use
of the concept of tacit knowledge again cre-
ates new problems due to the fact that ques-
tions of power are transformed into matters
of recognition and knowledge (Carlgren,
1990c). These new problems will be ad-
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dressed in the third part of this article. What
follows now is an account of the inexpres-
sibility version of tacit knowledge which was
primarily developed in the research at Ar-
beidslivcentrum in Sweden. 
There are two versions of this inexpress-
ibility with regards to understanding tacit
knowledge. One version is related to
Wittgenstein’s concept of practice and the
other to Dreyfus and Dreyfus’ (1986) con-
cept of intuitive expertise.
The Wittgensteinian Approach 
Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowledge has
been reinterpreted in light of Wittgenstein’s
late philosophy. This Wittgenstein-inspired
reinterpretation was made by the Norwegian
philosopher Johannessen (1988a; 1988b).
Johannessen bases his reinterpretation on
von Wright’s interpretations of Wittgen-
stein’s work. Von Wright presents Wittgen-
stein’s emphasis on practice as an argument
in favor of a kind of pre-knowledge (Johan-
nessen, 1988a, p. 357). Basically, Johannes-
sen argues that Wittgenstein distinguishes
between knowing linguistic rules and follow-
ing them. To follow linguistic rules is quite a
different matter from knowing them. Ac-
cording to Wittgenstein, the crux of the mat-
ter is how we follow rules since this is how
they are constituted and hence become mean-
ingful. The problem is to know how to follow
them in the actual situation. This calls for
something more than rules. 
In other words, there is more to using a
language than merely knowing the abstract,
linguistic rules. Wittgenstein characterizes
the rule-constituting actions as practice. To
follow a rule is practice, and when we follow
a rule, we do not consciously interpret every
rule before applying it. Rather, our use of
rules is defined by practice, that is, by the his-
torical context in which we follow them
(Johannessen, 1988b).
Tacit knowledge, then, describes how we ap-
ply our knowledge in practice, that is, how
the rules are followed in the actual situation.
According to Johannessen’s interpretation of
Wittgenstein, practice is basically tacit be-
cause it is part of our way of living and can-
not substantiate its own foundation in a ver-
bal discourse. Fundamentally, practice is
based on something that is inexpressible or,
in Wittgenstein’s words, “practice speaks for
itself” (Johannessen, 1988a). Practice is
characterized by aspects of inexpressibility,
that is, some aspects of practice can, in prin-
ciple, never be expressed linguistically.
The major difference between Wittgen-
stein’s and Polanyi’s approaches is that, a-
cording to the Wittgensteinian approach,
some elements of tacit knowledge can never
be made verbally explicit. Furthermore, ac-
cording to Polanyi’s approach to tacit knowl-
edge, rules for actions are central both in the
traditions and in the concept of tacit knowl-
edge. In the Wittgensteinian approach the di-
mension of inexpressibility is central and a
matter of addressing the activities which go
beyond the linguistic rules and are based on
life forms which speak for themselves.
The Approach by Dreyfus and Dreyfus
Dreyfus and Dreyfus are critical of Polanyi’s
definition of tacit knowledge (Dreyfus &
Dreyfus, 1986, p. 152). They find that tacit
knowledge, as Polanyi defines it, pays too
much attention to the mind as something that
is operated by rules. Instead, they suggest
that the concept of intuition is more precise
and operative than the concept of tacit
knowledge. This has led to that Dreyfus and
Dreyfus’ concept of intuition is frequently
used synonymously with the concept of tacit
knowledge within the approach of inexpress-
ibility (cf. Benner, 1984; Josefson, 1988a;
Göranzon, 1990). Dreyfus and Dreyfus’ un-
derstanding of intuitive expertise is unfolded
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in their model of skills. Their five-stage mod-
el of skill acquisition shows how the novice
practitioner acts exclusively on the basis of
the context-free rules that were acquired dur-
ing his or her theoretical training. After hav-
ing experienced how patterns repeat them-
selves in practical situations, the practitioner
will then develop from being an experienced
novice into a competent practitioner and will
finally become an expert. An expert is a prac-
titioner who primarily acts on the basis of in-
tuition (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986). The tran-
sition from acting on the basis of theoretical
rules to acting on the basis of intuition is a
consequence of how the person in question
becomes emotionally involved in practice.
Thus, Dreyfus and Dreyfus describe how the
individual practitioner, because of his or her
own actions and experiences from a number
of similar situations, will gradually become
aware of these similarities and thereby able
to predict how situations develop. In that
way, the practitioner accumulates knowledge
of which he or she is not conscious.
As mentioned above, Dreyfus and Drey-
fus replace the concept of tacit knowledge by
the concept of intuition. In other words, they
do not recognize tacit knowledge as a type of
knowledge but reserve the concept of knowl-
edge for a relatively narrow concept of rules.
Furthermore, Dreyfus and Dreyfus transform
the concept of tacit knowledge into a concept
of intuition as a sense belonging to the indi-
vidual, hence, abandoning the social perspec-
tive implied in different ways by Polanyi and
Wittgenstein.
Tacit Knowledge as Practical
Intelligence
Inspired by intelligence research, Wagner
and Sternberg (1985; 1986) and Wagner
(1987) use the concept of tacit knowledge as
practical intelligence. They find the tacit as-
pect of knowing to be a central characteristic
of practical intelligence since neither tacit
knowledge nor practical intelligence are ex-
pressed or taught directly and both are pri-
marily learned in informal settings (Wagner
& Sternberg, 1985, p. 439). Practical intelli-
gence is a different concept of intelligence
than the predominant, academic and formally
oriented concept of intelligence. Based on a
series of experiments on critical events,
Wagner and Sternberg (1986) attempted to
prove the existence of tacit knowledge. Here
tacit knowledge, or practical intelligence,
refers to an implicit concept of experience
operationalized in the following themes: to
be able to manage one’s career, how one opti-
mizes one’s reputation and how one succeeds
in “selling” one’s projects to one’s superiors.
In these experiments, selected people were
given a critical description of an event within
their professional area and then asked to an-
swer some questions. Two groups were se-
lected: a group of academic psychologists
and a group of managing directors. Both
groups were divided into subgroups: a group
of so-called experts (the experienced people)
and a group of so-called novices (the newly
educated). Naturally, the researchers expect-
ed the experts to possess a large amount of
professional tacit knowledge and the novices
to possess only a small amount. The results
of these experiments showed that apparently
there is a substantial difference between the
tacit knowledge of experts and novices with-
in different areas. In every respect it turned
out that the experts were better at managing
their careers – a fact which, according to
Wagner and Sternberg, proves the existence
of tacit knowledge.
Summary
There are many different ways of under-
standing the concept of tacit knowledge.
Three different ways were presented above:
tacit knowledge as (1) embedded in tradition,
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(2) an inexpressible dimension of practice
and (3) an aspect of practical intelligence.
Furthermore, one might argue that these vari-
ous definitions of tacit knowledge are mutu-
ally exclusive. Tacit knowledge is both de-
picted as a kind of knowledge which is rule
governed (the Polanyi-tradition) and as
something which is beyond rules (the Witt-
gensteinian tradition). It is presented both as
a personal experience embedded in tradition
(the Polanyi tradition) and as an individual
ability (Dreyfus and Dreyfus’ interpretation
of intuition). Finally, tacit knowledge is de-
picted both as an intuition that lies beyond
any conscious reflection (Dreyfus and
Dreyfus’ interpretation) and as an experience
based non-verbal intelligence of promoting
one’s career (Wagner and Sternberg’s sug-
gestion).
Besides introducing the concept of tacit
knowledge, the first part of this article em-
phasizes that the mutually exclusive and non-
coherent way of using the concept does not
merely serve academic interests. The defini-
tion and circulation of the concept of tacit
knowledge can be understood in relation to
fulfilling various motives in different set-
tings. By situating the definition and use of
the concept, it is stressed that concepts are
not only a way of representing the world, but
also a way of influencing and changing it.
This line of thinking will be pursued in the
second and third part of the article in which a
number of consequences of using the concept
of tacit knowledge will be outlined.
How, then, is a concept to be understood?
The traditional way of understanding a con-
cept would be to follow the author’s presen-
tation, his or her more or less consistent use
of it, the extent of its documentation, and so
forth. Or one might look at it critically, at-
tempt to falsify it, find inconsistencies in the
author’s use of it, and so forth.
My critical way of reading and compre-
hending the concept of tacit knowledge dif-
fers from these views. I consider tacit knowl-
edge, like any other circulating artifact, to be
determined by special, historical and societal
conditions. There are certain reasons why the
concept has become increasingly popular,
why it has been applied by certain groups,
why it is distributed in different contexts, and
so forth. Thus, the concept of tacit knowl-
edge cannot merely be considered a concept
that describes something out there “in real
life”. It must be seen as a concept that is cre-
ated, circulated and applied in relation to a
number of different interests. Whereas the
presentation and reading of a concept is tradi-
tionally separated from the effect it may have
on a broader societal context, my presenta-
tion postulates that it is not possible to sepa-
rate the understanding of a concept from its




In order to understand the circulation and dis-
tribution of the concept of tacit knowledge,
one must understand the development of new
professions in connection with the establish-
ment of the modern welfare state. In 1960
large parts of the population in the Western
world were occupied in the primary produc-
tion (the extraction of raw material – farm-
ing, mining, fishing industry, etc.) or in the
secondary production (the manufacturing of
goods). In the future, the majority of the pop-
ulation will be occupied within the service
sector – the new professions (Fjord Jensen,
1987). This implies an expansion in the num-
ber of people employed in the service indus-
try within the educational sector and the na-
tional health services (e.g., doctors, nurses,
educationists, teachers, etc.). In the total la-
bor force the number of professionals in-
creased from 4% in 1900 to 8% in 1950 and
to 13% in 1966 (Schön, 1983, p. 18). Num-
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bers from the expanding profession of psy-
chology in Denmark illustrate precisely this
development. Around 1974 approximately
2,500 psychologists were organized while to-
day the figure has increased to nearly 7,000.2
The new professions legitimate them-
selves with science claiming that by applying
scientific theories and methods practitioners
are able to solve the problems they encounter
in the practice of their work. The scientific
nature of the knowledge and theory that are
focused on here originates from positivism
(Schön, 1983, p. 29). That is, knowledge is
presented as an object available for users in
relation to any specific situation. The pre-
dominant knowledge and learning model of
the new professions can, in short, be charac-
terized as technical rationality which consists
in an instrumental solution to a well-defined
problem that is laid down by scientific
knowledge and theory (Schön, 1983). Thus,
technical rationality is regarded as exempt
from subjective experiences, appearing as
objectified in already existing procedures
and formalities which are at people’s dispos-
al in the actual situation. In other words, this
understanding of knowledge does not focus
on the practitioner’s actions and experiences
in the actual situation; on the contrary, it fo-
cuses on the importance of following pre-
given directions of how to do things in prac-
tice.
This understanding of knowledge has dif-
ferent consequences.
One consequence of technical rationality
is that the meaning of context, experience
and action is neglected in the educational
context and that the practitioners’ experi-
ences become unnecessary. This way of de-
picting knowledge is dominant and lies at the
heart of a number of educational institutions’
conception of knowledge. It will disregard
the concrete conduct of professional practice,
and it creates a distinction between education
and work practice within the profession.
Another consequence involves our under-
standing of learning. Learning is basically
seen as a transmission of knowledge from
someone who already knows to someone
who does not know. Learning becomes a
technical question related to finding the most
efficient ways of making the transmission of
knowledge function (cf. Dreier, 2002).
The third, and possibly most important,
consequence is that in the post-industrial so-
ciety technical rationality appears to be legit-
imating a number of dominating institutions
and professions (cf. Wackerhausen, 1992).
Today the need to legitimate one’s actions in
relation to a scientific codex plays an impor-
tant role in almost all modern institutions (cf.
Molander, 1990). Knowledge is no longer le-
gitimated in relation to its emancipating or
educative character; on the contrary, knowl-
edge has to increase the performance of so-
cial systems. Indeed, it must possess the
characteristic of problem solving implied by
the core definition of technical rationality.
Knowledge is merely seen as valid when it
can increase the efficiency of the system
(Lyotard, 1991).
A central issue for the different profes-
sions that appeared in the wake of the mod-
ern welfare state is that they face many intri-
cate problems which technical rationality can
no longer solve. The problems which the pro-
fessional practitioner faces require another
set of themes than the one provided by tech-
nical rationality. Hence, the new professions
encounter a number of dilemmas. On the one
hand, in order not to lose prestige the profes-
sions must define themselves in relation to
the scientific discourse, and only those pro-
fessions that define themselves as scientific
are recognized. On the other hand, technical
rationality is apparently not very efficient in
relation to the particular problems the practi-
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tioners are confronted with (Schön, 1983).
Because of this dilemma, a need is created
for a concept that is able to contain the expe-
riences of professional practitioners and at
the same time be included and legitimated by
scientific discourses. As mentioned above,
the growing interest in the concept of tacit
knowledge is based on these dilemmas.
The consequences of tacit
knowledge in practice
Thus, tacit knowledge can be considered a
conglomerate or a compromise of the two
tendencies through which the professions
seem to develop. On the one hand, the pro-
fessions require scientific legitimacy. On the
other hand, the professions need to identify
and define practice in accordance with the
actual experiences of the members of the pro-
fession. However, as I shall argue below, the
concept of tacit knowledge does not make
professional practice more accessible to the
participants. On the contrary, by legitimating
practice as an epistemological matter, profes-
sional practice becomes mysterious and rei-
fied and, consequently, more inaccessible to
the participants. I shall argue that the use of
tacit knowledge will lead to a marginaliza-
tion of the participants’ experiences, to social
uniformity, individualism and a dualistic
view of knowledge. 
Tacit Knowledge and Marginalization
of Experiences
By introducing tacit knowledge as a legiti-
mating foundation for professional practice, I
argue that central experiences will be mar-
ginalized or neglected. Issues of politics,
ethics and values will be marginalized in fa-
vor of discussions about knowing the world. 
As mentioned above, the central tendency
for the new professions is to seek legitimacy
in the scientific environment. Most research
that addresses the concept of tacit knowledge
tends to focus on this issue. In connection
with research on how the introduction of new
technology influences the workplace, one of
the pioneers in the re-launch of the concept of
tacit knowledge, Göranzon, writes that,
“close cooperation with philosophers has
been of great importance” (Göranzon, 1983,
p. 8, my translation). In other words, in order
to legitimate the specific (tacit) knowledge of
the professional practitioners, science must
legitimate it as valuable in an epistemologi-
cal sense. Göranzon suggests that profession-
al practitioners seem to be in possession of a
practical intellect. The aim is to conceptual-
ize practice in new ways by means of the
concept of tacit knowledge and similar con-
cepts, thus, protecting the specific knowl-
edge existing in certain work communities.
The concept of tacit knowledge is well suited
for this purpose. Most research on tacit
knowledge points to the fact that the concept
is difficult to define, let alone identify empir-
ically, and several authors imply that the use
of the concept of tacit knowledge is embed-
ded in strategic considerations. Molander
emphasizes that the concept is difficult to de-
fine, but by using it one will contribute to an
increase in “social and political status” of the
actors (1990, p. 108).
By returning to the historical analyses that
seem to legitimate tacit knowledge, these au-
thors often focus on the threat that the com-
puterization of society presents to local work
communities. Janik’s formulation makes this
very clear:
Tacit knowledge is intimately connected to the
kind of qualitative differentiation that exists be-
tween products of human experience and prod-
ucts of machine efficiency (Janik, 1989, p. 10, my
translation).
Here Janik emphasizes that tacit knowledge
defends the kind of knowledge which is relat-
ed to human experience and which is defined
10
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in contrast to the computerization of this
knowledge.
The problem with conceptualizing work
practice as a question of different ways of un-
derstanding knowledge will result in that cer-
tain problems become conspicuous while
other problems are not considered at all. In
other words, this way of conceptualizing a
work practice as an epistemological problem
implies that some problems appear to be cen-
tral while others are neglected. The fact that
some tasks change in connection with the
computerization of workplaces will become
an epistemological issue between tacit and
explicit knowledge. Only issues that fall
within this area are acknowledged. Other as-
pects of the issue disappear or are neglected.
As an illustration of this, we may mention the
research project at Arbeidslivscentrum called
PASS. PASS, i.e., perspektiv på datasyste-
mutveckling (perspective on data system de-
velopment), is a research project which led to
the development of many of the different
meanings of the concept of tacit knowledge
(Göranzon, 1983). For instance, in the inter-
views from this research project many of the
interviewees assert that the installment of
computers will lead to increased surveil-
lance, central control, isolation of the indi-
vidual employee, unemployment, and so
forth (cf. Göranzon, 1983, p. 216). But these
issues are not emphasized in connection with
the discourse on tacit knowledge. The result
of placing issues of power in an epistemolog-
ical framework is that some aspects disap-
pear while others emerge. All questions con-
cerning moral, ethics and politics disappear
in favor of discussions of new ways of know-
ing the world. 
Tacit Knowledge Creates Social
Uniformity
We have now seen that the concept of tacit
knowledge is also intended to promote the in-
terests of a number of different professions,
and we have seen how it originates from a
critique of the general trend to reify knowl-
edge. In the following, I shall argue that the
concept of tacit knowledge must necessarily
function as an unclear, yet central concept for
members of the work community and profes-
sion.
Tacit knowledge can be considered a con-
cept which apparently creates a certain kind
of coherence within the profession or the
work community, not because of its clarity or
illustrative power but because it holds the in-
expressible factor that binds the members to-
gether in a status of obscurity. Tacit knowl-
edge stands as a concept of the inexpressible
factor or as a category that does not identify
anything, but which is of value because it
states that the members are bound to each
other by a shared accumulation of knowl-
edge. The heterogeneity and division of labor
of the social field of action in relation to spe-
cific tasks are transformed into a homoge-
neous accumulation of knowledge. In order
to clarify these themes, we may draw on
Ryle’s concept of category-mistake.
From Ryle’s perspective, the concept of
tacit knowledge can be considered a catego-
ry-mistake. A category-mistake denotes that
the description of actual characteristics of
things, events or people may be confused
with the general category for this behavior
(Ryle, 1976). The category-mistake may
cause a double-world thinking.3 Ryle used
the concept of category-mistake to point out
that Descartes’ differentiation between con-
ceptual matter (res cogitans) and physical
matter (res extensa) is a category-mistake. In
connection with this category-mistake, phi-
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losophers have been of the opinion that a
form of conceptual matter actually did exists,
but in reality different categories were con-
fused linguistically. An action-oriented as-
pect of a practice was mystified and turned
into a non-specific object.
The same argument can be made in rela-
tion to tacit knowledge. We may look at how
the professional practitioner performs a num-
ber of qualified actions, and we may identify
these actions as expressions of tacit knowl-
edge. However, the very moment we find
tacit knowledge as an actually existing kind
of knowledge, we make a category-mistake
by assuming that tacit knowledge really ex-
ists. The concept of tacit knowledge will be-
come the new ghost in the machine.
Ryle’s implication that the categorical
confusion is a mistake, is, however, not nec-
essarily correct in this casd. The categorical
confusions may serve a purpose. The concept
of tacit knowledge actually seems to have a
unifying function as an indubitable element
for the members of the profession. Further-
more, tacit knowledge hinders non-members
from getting access to take over vital work
assignments and thereby gain influence. It is
no coincidence that the first to circulate the
concept of tacit knowledge was Kuhn (Kuhn,
1970, p. 43-45). According to Kuhn, tacit
knowledge covers precisely the common
rules that create the implicit basis for the par-
adigms which define the scientific standards. 
Contrary to Kuhn, the concept of tacit knowl-
edge offers no possibility for establishing an
internal, critical dialogue that may renew and
change the profession from within, so to
speak. There is very little chance that the pro-
fessions themselves can establish changes,
shifts in paradigms or carry out other radical
changes based on the concept of tacit knowl-
edge. In this sense, the concept of tacit
knowledge is preservative in relation to al-
ready established forms of practice. The con-
cept of tacit knowledge will, hence, keep
those possible conflicts and oppositions at a
distance which might actually transform and
change the profession or the work communi-
ty by means of critical dialogue. 
The Reappearance of Individualism
As mentioned above, the concept of tacit
knowledge implicitly served as a glue for sci-
entific communities of practice. I shall argue
below that the concept of tacit knowledge
creates the illusion that work communities
are unified by a homogeneous core of knowl-
edge that is generally agreed upon, thereby
distracting attention from the fact that prac-
tice is constituted by a number of social posi-
tions that are defined in relation as well as in
contrast to each other. The concept of tacit
knowledge distracts attention from the fact
that conflicts and oppositions are the dynam-
ic reasons for development and change and
leads to a focus on the abilities and capacities
of the individual.
It is, therefore, in line with this thinking
that the concept of tacit knowledge seems to
re-establish an individualistic approach to
professional practice.4 This return to individ-
ualism must have its background in internal
rivalry and power struggles among profes-
sions. It is not a matter of professions func-
tionally dividing the various work fields be-
tween themselves but of rivaling professions
struggling to define and delimit attractive
work fields in relation to the interests of their
profession. One example may be the ongoing
conflict between teachers and educationists
in Denmark as to who should be the key fig-
ures in connection with the introductory peri-
ods of school attendance for small children.
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4 Here tacit knowledge is, of course, understood as
a dimension of inexpressibility, intuition or practical
intelligence while, according to Polanyi’s understan-
ding of tacit knowledge, traditions, that is, collective
historical actions, are central.
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A similar professional conflict may be found
within the national health services where
doctors, nurses and assistant nurses try to
dominate different work assignments.
In connection with these rivalries, the con-
cept of tacit knowledge plays an important
role. It is no mere coincidence that the pro-
fession of nursing, in a squeeze between doc-
tors and assistant nurses, found the concept
useful (cf. e.g. Josefson, 1988a; Benner,
1984). The concept of tacit knowledge dis-
places the focus on social position and pow-
er-oriented relations to link actions and their
legitimacy to the tacit knowledge of the indi-
vidual professional, hence focusing away
from social interaction, oppositions and pow-
er struggles towards the capacities of the in-
dividual. The individual is, in other words,
de-contextualized.
The individual practitioner has gained a
prescriptive right to tacit knowledge ex-
pressed by intuition and feelings as legiti-
mate grounds for action. Tacit knowledge is
to define the reputation and social status of
the individual while other aspects are left out.
The following example shows how tacit
knowledge may appear as a personal capaci-
ty and not be related to a certain social status.
The example is from Benner’s studies of the
development of nurses from novices to ex-
perts, and it shows the expert nurse’s capacity
in connection with the work of diagnosing
mental illness in patients. Benner’s studies of
the development of nurses is the empirical
basis for the skill model on intuitive expertise
by Dreyfus and Dreyfus. Benner writes:
“When I tell a doctor: the patient is psychotic, I
do not know how to legitimize it? But I am never
wrong. Because I am extremely familiar with
psychoses. And I know it so well that I know what
it is, and I trust that” (Benner, 1984, p. 32).
This example illustrates how, based on tacit
knowledge, the practitioner’s action is legiti-
mated as professional intuition in relation to
members of another profession, the doctors.
In reality, the practitioner acts on the basis of
his or her specific social position which pro-
vides the person with power and incon-
testable authority. The infallible diagnosis
may just as well be due to the fact that the
nurse is positioned in an institutional com-
munity in which she has the power of classi-
fication and in which no other member of the
community can question this classification.
In other words, it is difficult to distinguish
between the classification of the patient and
the stigmatizing exertion of power. The intro-
duction of tacit knowledge into practice,
thus, contributes to shifting the focus towards
the capacities of an ahistorical individual and
away from a socially situated, relational un-
derstanding of knowledge and the individual.
Tacit knowledge de-contextualizes the differ-
ent positions within the profession.
Dualism Maintained
The concept of tacit knowledge maintains
rather than transcends the dualistic perspec-
tive on knowledge. As mentioned above, tac-
it knowledge has been defined as an alterna-
tive to technical rationality within the episte-
mological paradigm. The traditional way of
dividing intuition and tacit knowledge from
scientific rationality has been to present this
as a division between an unclear, mythical
and magical line of thought, on the one hand,
and a systematic, scientific line of thought,
on the other hand (cf. Lave, 1988). This dual-
ism is captured in contrasting the concept of
tacit knowledge with technical rationality,
and it is repeated in many of the stories relat-
ed to the concept of tacit knowledge, for in-
stance, in Josefson’s presentation of the intu-
itive and tacit actions of the expert nurse
(Josefson, 1988b).
Josefson presents an example in which a
nurse with thirty years of professional expe-
rience – mainly with post-surgery patients –
13
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met a patient who said that he was fine and
okay after his operation. This statement was
supported by objective, observable indica-
tions. Yet, the nurse felt that something was
wrong. She sent for a young doctor who did
not find anything wrong and blamed the
nurse for having sent for him for no reason.
However, the patient then died during the
night. The nurse had noticed that something
was out of the ordinary but could not explain
how she had arrived at this conclusion.
Josefson’s example illustrates how the
medical, systematic, scientific line of thought
fails while intuition dominates. The story
shows that it is a matter of two basic kinds of
knowledge in opposition to each other. The
same dualism can be found in the five-stage
model of learning developed by Dreyfus and
Dreyfus (1986). Their model also clearly dis-
tinguishes between the types of knowledge
that are related to context-free rules, on the
one hand, and intuitive pattern recognition,
on the other hand.
In this respect, the values have simply
been turned upside down. The Western, sys-
tematic rationality (“the doctor”) is not asso-
ciated with positive values. On the contrary,
the local cultures (the “primitive” people)
and professional practitioners (“the nurse”)
now possess and define the positive values.
The dualism between rationality and magic
still exists, only with a different set of value
poles. Whereas technical rationality is a per-
verted version of the Western thought of the
enlightenment, one may consider the concept
of tacit knowledge to be a caricature of the
ideal knowledge of romanticism.
The problem with this clear-cut dualism
between the two types of knowledge is that it
implies a particular understanding of the so-
cial world. This dualistic understanding im-
plies that an already objective world exists,
independent of human actions or beings.
That has been termed the ‘prejudice of an ob-
jective world’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1981; Kvale,
1968). The implicit assumption of this notion
is that we must clearly realize that this objec-
tive world is present in all our actions. When
that turns out not to be the case, the concept
of tacit knowledge is invented. Polanyi ex-
emplifies tacit knowledge with the well-
known observation that one can ride a bike
without actually knowing what one does and
yet continue riding it. The illustration of the
bike ride supports the thought that we must
apparently not be completely aware of the al-
ready existing world and anything we do in
it, and if that is not the case the auxiliary hy-
pothesis of “tacit knowledge” must be intro-
duced. The rational line of thought constructs
tacit knowledge as a convenient auxiliary hy-
pothesis. If, alternatively, we consider the
world from the perspective of the actor in a
social context, it is possible to maintain that –
due to the fact that we exist in time and space
as well as in a social world – actions must be
considered unfinished business. Our partici-
pation will hence always include an unclear
dimension. This dimension is, however, not
to be considered a type of knowledge. On the
contrary, it is an implicit consequence of the
fact that our existence is constantly modified
by our participation in a social world.
Summary and new questions
In this article I have taken a critical stand on
the concept of tacit knowledge in discussions
of professional practice. As a point of depar-
ture I raised the question, what would be the
consequences of approaching practice as an
epistemological matter rather than in terms
of activity. I outlined three different ways of
conceptualizing tacit knowledge, namely:
tacit knowledge as tradition, as an inexpress-
ible dimension of practice and, finally, as a
kind of intelligence. And I argued that these
definitions of tacit knowledge are not ho-
mogenous but mutually exclusive. 
Furthermore, I looked critically at tacit
14
Outlines-2002-2.qxd  30-01-2003  11:38  Side 14
knowledge by relating it to the growth of pro-
fessions in modern society. It was argued that
tacit knowledge could be seen as a compro-
mise between legitimating the professions in
accordance with scientific standards and of-
fering a concept about the specific experi-
ences of professional practitioners. However,
this way of conceptualizing practice from an
epistemological perspective gave rise to new
questions and contained a number of impor-
tant problems. 
As argued above, the new professions
must find ways of legitimating themselves.
Using the concept of tacit knowledge for this
purpose tends to turn it into a black box
which makes practice mysterious and inac-
cessible. However, we should also take into
account which phenomena the concept of
tacit knowledge is pointing at. Social practice
consists of a mixture of social habits, histori-
cally grounded modes of actions, knowledge
distributed in work practices and tools.
Although a large part of one’s participation in
a social practice is not articulated verbally,
that does not entail that this kind of participa-
tion is founded on tacit knowledge. Rather
than placing habitual, collective elements of
actions and tool-mediated participation in the
category of tacit knowledge, it seems more
appropriate to categorize and describe these
activities concretely as they take place in
practice. 
As an alternative to using the concept of
tacit knowledge I argue for the necessity of
not letting the concrete practice out of sight
when a practice is legitimated. Rather than
transforming practice into categories of
knowledge, it is important to describe and re-
late to the ongoing practice as it unfolds in all
its diversity. In other words, we need to ac-
count for the collective nature of activities in
practice rather than to focus on different cate-
gories of knowledge. Rhetorically speaking,
one could state that knowledge needs to be
moved from the head and placed in the world
again, that is, described as it progresses in so-
cial activities with tools. We need to ask criti-
cally what is gained by conceptualizing prac-
tice as tacit. Rather than placing particular
activities into categories of knowledge, we
need to describe in detail what happens in so-
cial situations. The concept of tacit knowl-
edge actually does address the notion of
habits directly or indirectly. But we need to
approach habits as more than efficient rou-
tines. An understanding of social habits calls
for historical analyses of the bodily nature of
social practice. Furthermore, we ought to ask
critically for whom specific kinds of knowl-
edge are tacit? Is it for the observer – the sci-
entist –, for the practitioner or for the client?
And finally, we need to ask whose knowl-
edge is tacit in a social practice? Here we
need to focus on social positions and on how
knowledge is used to maintain social posi-
tions and privileges. I shall end this article
with Erwin Straus’ words about the uncon-
scious, now slightly changed to cover the
concept of tacit knowledge: “The tacit
knowledge of the practitioner is more often
than not the verbal and explicit theories of the
social scientist” (freely interpreted from
Straus, 1958, p. 151). 
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